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I. INTRODUCTION
As early as 1992, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) recommended changes to the text of Article 9. After
years of work on this project, the revised version has finally been sent to the
States and has been widely accepted, having become effective on July 2001.1
The changes from the prior version of Article 9 are indeed numerous, and
scholars have been busy bringing the breadth of these changes to light. How-
ever, this note focuses on one rather narrow, and somewhat ambiguous, point
of change - a revision that has potentially widespread implications for the
shape of secured transactions. This note covers revised Article 9's treatment of
tracing principles and, more particularly, how the processes in these principles
can be used to identify commingled proceeds in deposit accounts under revised
Section 9-315. This new Section 9-315 is markedly different than its counter-
part in the prior version's Section 9-306.2 This note will attempt to highlight
some of the benefits of the revision in terms of its practical use for lawyers and
courts, as well as some of the problems that will likely be encountered in its
application in real cases.
By way of explanation, it should be noted that "tracing" is the process
used by courts in many different areas of law to identify and segregate property
that has been mingled with other property in such a manner that it has lost its
identity. This includes all types of property, from logs in a river or wheat in a
silo to cash in a deposit account. For example, well-established tracing rules
are used in community property jurisdictions when divorcees are faced with the
task of segregating the marital and the community property. Divorce is merely
one of a host of situations where courts need to use tracing to "identify" and
* J.D., William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (2002).
U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2 (2000). See also Bruce A. Markell, Symposium on Revised UCC
Article 9, From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and
Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 969 (1999).
2 Because this note undertakes a comparison of the current Article 9 with the revised version
on the brink of the delayed effectiveness date, there is a potential for confusion in referring
to Article 9 and using the terms "current" and "former;" hence, the pre-revised Article 9 is
referred to as "former" Article 9, and the post-revision Article 9 is the "current" version,
despite the fact that not all the jurisdictions have currently adopted the revised version.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
segregate property in order to assign ownership to it. Tracing becomes espe-
cially important in the context of secured transactions when collateral is sold by
a debtor, and the proceeds of the sale are placed into a deposit account contain-
ing other funds belonging to the debtor. When this occurs, the critical question
for the secured creditor is, how may it go about reclaiming collateral that has
"disappeared" through the debtor's careless (or, in some cases, unscrupulous)
acts?
A. Tracing Principles In Common Secured Transactions
In order to more fully understand the tracing concept, consider the follow-
ing hypothetical. Assume Andrew wants to purchase a car from Bob for
$1,000 but cannot pay the whole sum all at once. The two agree that Andrew
will pay $200 installments over five months, from January through May, with
payments due on the first day of each month. The parties execute a promissory
note, security agreement, and financing statement (which is timely filed),
describing the car as collateral, thereby giving Bob the right to repossess the car
if Andrew defaults on the terms of the agreement. At that point, Bob may feel
"secure" in the knowledge that, if the payments are not forthcoming, he is
empowered to repossess the car in order to recoup anything due on the note.
Now assume that, on March 15 (a little over three months later), with $400
remaining due under the note with Bob, Andrew discovers that he can no
longer afford to make the payments. Without getting permission from Bob,
Andrew sells the car to Charles on March 16 for $400 - exactly the amount that
Andrew owes on the note. As long as Andrew uses the money to pay off the
note, there will likely be no problem.
However, assume instead the worst case scenario: Andrew takes the $400
in proceeds, places it into his bank account and, instead of paying off Bob, pays
his rent. When Bob does not receive his money on April 1, he will demand
return of the car (his collateral), which is now owned by Charles. Former Arti-
cle 9 dealt with this situation under Section 9-306, which provided in pertinent
part: "a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange
or other disposition thereof [unless the sale was authorized by the secured
party], and also continues in any identifiable proceeds (emphasis added)."
Thus, Bob's security interest continues in the car itself and he has the right to
attempt to repossess. In the alternative, Bob could choose to pursue the pro-
ceeds ($400) of the sale between Andrew and Charles.
While former Section 9-306 states the general rule - that Bob's security
interest continues in the identifiable proceeds of the sale of his collateral -
revised Article 9 identifies some exceptions to this rule. For example, under
the new Section 9-315(a)(1), a security interest in collateral terminates if the
secured party "authorized disposition free of the security interest . . . .,3 Thus,
had Bob authorized the sale of the car free of the security interest, he would not
be entitled to pursue the car, but rather, only the identifiable proceeds (which
were deposited into Andrew's account). Other exceptions exist as well,4 which
3 Also explained at U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 2 (2000).
4 Likewise, this concept is explained at U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 2 (2000). Another exception,
noted in U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 2 (2000), which will be explained more fully later in this note,
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will be addressed subsequently throughout this note, but for now, it suffices to
understand that limited circumstances do exist where collateral can be disposed
of free of security interests.
1. Section 9-306 and Identifiability
The key restriction that Section 9-306 placed upon Bob was that the pro-
ceeds of the sale between Andrew and Charles be identifiable. As mentioned
previously, tracing is the method in Article 9 by which these proceeds are iden-
tified and, in a sense, recaptured as collateral. This method is critical when
proceeds are placed in bank deposit accounts because the debtor often has other
funds entering and exiting its account on a regular basis. To continue with the
prior hypothetical, assume that, after Andrew pays his rent ($300), $100
remains in the account. A week later, Andrew deposits his paycheck in the
amount of $500, bringing the balance up to $600. Then Andrew withdraws
$500, which he spends on groceries and entertainment, bringing his balance
down to $100 at the end of March. Finally, Andrew receives one last paycheck
on March 27. On that date, his bank ledger would look like this:
Date Deposit Withdrawal Balance
March 15 None None $0.00
March 16 $400 (proceeds of car) $400
March 17 $300 (rent) $100
March 25 $500 (paycheck) $600
March 26 $500 (food/etc) $100
March 27 $500 (paycheck) $600
On April 1, Bob will not receive his $200 car payment, which is an act of
default under the terms of his security agreement with Andrew. At this point
Bob will accelerate his loan and demand immediate payment of the remaining
$400. Since Andrew has many creditors calling, and is not able to pay them all,
he declares bankruptcy on April 1, leaving all his creditors (Bob included) to
fight over his assets. The most immediately appealing asset will be the cash in
Bob's account - and, as mentioned, Section 9-306 entitles Bob to payment of
the proceeds of the car sale to Charles. Thus, Bob will claim entitlement to part
of the remaining $600 balance as his collateral. This is an area where tracing
principles become critical. As mentioned, Bob may still pursue repossession of
the car itself, but that process may be time consuming and costly. If he can
establish a claim to any of the money in the account, Bob may be able to
shortcut that process in order to satisfy his claim. Through tracing, Bob can
identify that part of the money in the bank account to which he is entitled.
is the rule found at U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2000). This rule states that a secured party who
entrusts collateral to a merchant who deals in goods of the kind gives that merchant the
power to transfer the collateral, free of the security interest to buyers in the ordinary course
of business. Another rule along these lines described in this note is U.C.C. § 9-331 (2000),
which states that purchasers of negotiable instruments, negotiable documents, and securities
take free of perfected security interests, even if the secured party does not authorize their
disposition.
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2. Tracing under Revised Article 9: Section 9-315(b)(2)
Under former Article 9, the question of which of the funds Bob is entitled
to would be relatively simple. Various jurisdictions employ a few different
methods of tracing secured collateral, including a few, widely used and rigid
equitable principles, which will be discussed below. However, the revised ver-
sion of Section 9-306, now found at Section 9-315, may well change the way in
which commingled funds are traced. The new text reads, in pertinent part at 9-
315(b):
Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds ... if the
proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the secured party identifies the proceeds by
a method of tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted
under law other than this article with respect to commingled property of the type
involved (emphasis added).
This italicized language, new to revised Article 9, is the focus of this com-
ment. Under revised Article 9, commingled property may be identified through
the use of equitable principles permitted under non-Article 9 law - but the new
language does not identify what those principles, or other areas of law, might
be. This comment attempts to uncover what meaning the Article 9 drafters
intended to ascribe to this language.
3. The Equitable Tracing Principles
While the rule seems simple enough at face value, the fact is that very few
equitable tracing principles are employed in areas of law other than secured
transactions. What's more, some of these tracing principles are already
employed by a few jurisdictions in some secured transactions contexts. These
principles include the following, which will be discussed at length throughout
the remainder of this note: (a) the lowest intermediate balance rule (LIBR),
adopted from trust accounting, which is currently the mainstay of secured trans-
actions tracing; (b) the pro rata distribution hybrid of the lowest intermediate
balance rule, used in more complicated commingling cases, where multiple
trust funds are mingled, a scenario that presents complex priority problems; (c)
the first-in first-out rule (FIFO) and the similar last-in first-out rule (LIFO),
also principles of trust accounting; (d) the community-out first rule, from com-
munity property law, which is actually the same as the trustee-outfirst rule and
the functional equivalent of the lowest intermediate balance rule; and (e) the
rule of "approximate correctness"5 from both trust and property law.
Perhaps the drafters included the new Section 9-315 language because
they perceived inequities in the manner in which commingled funds are cur-
rently being traced and segregated: primarily through use of the lowest inter-
mediate balance rule.
As this note will argue, reviewing these equitable tracing principles actu-
ally raises many more questions than it answers about how they are supposed to
function in the Article 9 context. The lowest intermediate balance rule, as will
be explained, is generally applied in a wooden manner by the courts, at times
resulting in rigid consequences for innocent creditors. Assuming that the draft-
5 The author invented this name for reference in this note; the concept does not otherwise
have an assigned reference or title in the courts that have adopted it.
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ers wanted to change this area of law, it is difficult to understand why they have
tackled the problem in the manner in which they have. In fact, after reviewing
these equitable principles, it appears that the drafters may be guilty of sloppy
drafting in that the immediate implications of this new rule do not appear to
have been considered very thoroughly. Adopting tracing principles from other
areas of law is instantly problematic in secured transactions because of the
complex priority issues that have to be dealt with any time collateral is secured
by more than one creditor. These problems can present themselves even in the
most basic cases, not to mention complex commercial transactions. While the
lowest intermediate balance rule may engender harsh results in some cases,
courts have generally found the rule to be competent in dealing with priority
issues. In addition, it should be noted that some of the equitable tracing princi-
ples discussed in this note, more specifically LIFO and FIFO, have already
been rejected in some jurisdictions because they are perceived to be inferior to
the lowest intermediate balance rule.
The purpose of this note is not to advocate the return to former Section 9-
306 with its emphasis on the lowest intermediate balance rule. In fact, that rule
will be analyzed and both its strengths and weaknesses will be considered in
order to show that it does function better in some cases than in others. In
addition, this note analyzes equitable tracing principles used in other areas of
law and attempts to make sense of the options now available to practitioners
and courts when dealing with secured transactions tracing issues in the course
of litigation. The gift of alternatives is the fruit of this new change in the law.
It is noteworthy to mention that there are cases where the lowest interme-
diate balance rule is simply ineffective in achieving fair results; thus, practition-
ers can often point out the inadequacies of whatever tracing rule their courts
generally apply, and argue that some other rule should be used in a particular
case. While each of the principles discussed herein may have problems in par-
ticular cases for one reason or another, this is to be expected due to the com-
plexity of secured transactions law. However, telling lawyers that they can
only use the lowest intermediate balance rule for tracing is like telling a
mechanic he can only use a screwdriver to fix your car. The real efficacy of
this new language is that it may allow lawyers to decide which of the various
tracing principles can best be employed to advocate for their client in a particu-
lar case. Courts have the ability to go beyond the traditional lowest intermedi-
ate balance rule (or whatever other rule is employed in a particular jurisdiction)
and employ a method that will better achieve fair and equitable results to the
parties before them. In other words, while any one of these tracing principles is
highly imperfect in dealing with all commingling cases, the new language gives
more tracing tools to lawyers and courts facing tracing issues. It invites courts
to apply the various principles as equity may require, which may lead to more
palatable results in many cases. This note analyzes these new options available
to courts.
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II. ARTICLE 9'S PRESENT APPROACH TO TRACING PRINCIPLES
A. The Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule
In order to understand why some parties might be interested in using this
new Article 9 language to their benefit, one should begin by considering the
manner in which tracing is currently dealt with under secured transactions law.
Comment 3 to Section 9-315 indicates, not surprisingly, that "[almong the
'equitable principles' whose use other law may permit is the lowest intermedi-
ate balance rule." This rule is used extensively in many American jurisdictions
for the purpose of tracing commingled collateral. 6 Adapted from the trust law,7
it permits a beneficiary of trust funds that have been wrongfully disposed of by
the trustee to acquire a lien on property purchased with the trust funds in breach
of the trust. A key element, however, is that the product of the trust property be
identifiable (traceable).8 As a result, if the product is easily identifiable, it is
captured as collateral for the benefit of the trust; however, if the product is not
easily identifiable, then fictional identification principles (such as those
described in this paper) are used to identify the trust property, to the benefit of
the trust. In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club9 is a typical example of this rule
applied. In that case, Oriental (a rug dealer) entered into a "consignment agree-
ment ' l with Yashar (a supplier), in which Oriental agreed to sell Yashar's
rugs and pay a total consignment price of $106,073 for these.1 ' In breach of
this arrangement, Oriental sold some of the rugs, but invested the proceeds into
new inventory from other suppliers instead of remitting them.' 2 Since this
action constituted a breach of the consignment agreement, Yashar repossessed
its unsold rugs from Oriental.13 Oriental subsequently filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy, with $64,243 still remaining due to Yashar from Oriental. 14 At
that point, Yashar claimed that it was entitled to a lien on Oriental's current
6 Jurisdictions employing this rule include Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Utah;
see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Norstar Bank, 532 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (1988).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 (1959), reviewed by U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 3
(2000), states:
(1) Where the trustee by the wrongful disposition of trust property acquires other property, the
beneficiary is entitled at his option either to enforce a constructive trust of the property so
acquired or to enforce an equitable lien upon it to secure his claim against the trustee for dam-
ages for breach of trust, as long as the product of the trust property is held by the trustee and can
be traced.
(emphasis added).
8 Id.
9 205 B.R. 407 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997), cited in LYNN LoPUCm & ELIZABETH WARREN,
SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (3d ed. 2000).
10 Revised Article 9, pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(4) (2000), governs consignment agree-
ments of the type created in this case; the court explains that this agreement would be treated
like a standard floorplan arrangement.
" Oriental Rug, 205 B.R. at 409.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
[Vol. 3:135
Fall 2002] TRACING PRINCIPLES IN REVISED ARTICLE 9 141
inventory, in the amount of the remaining debt. 15 The bankruptcy court was
unwilling to grant this relief based on then-current Article 9 tracing law. 6
The court indicated that the secured party has the burden to establish that
its proceeds are identifiable: "the secured party must 'trace' the claimed pro-
ceeds back to the original collateral."' 7 In other words, Yashar had the burden
to establish a tie between the proceeds of his rugs and the purchase of the new
inventory. Elaborating on the difficulty with which creditors like Yashar must
establish their claims, the court noted:
Special tracing problems arise when cash proceeds are commingled with other depos-
its in a single bank account. Because of the fungible nature of cash proceeds, there is
some authority that cash proceeds are no longer identifiable once they are commin-
gled with other funds. The majority of courts, however, have established equitable
principles borrowed from the law of trusts to identify whether commingled funds
constitute proceeds received from an earlier disposition of collateral. In particular,
these courts have used the "intermediate balance rule," which creates a presumption
that the proceeds of the disposition of collateral remain in a commingled account as
long as the account balance is equal to or exceeds the amount of the proceeds.
Therefore, the intermediate balance rule presumes that a debtor who spends money
from a commingled account spends first from his own funds.18
This court's statement touches on two key facets of the lowest intermedi-
ate balance rule: (1) the difference between actual and fictional tracing; and (2)
the manner in which the lowest intermediate balance rule works.
1. Actual v. Fictional Tracing
The Oriental Rug court explains the fact that "identifiability" in the cases
where tracing is required is actually a term of art; as the court explains, money
is fungible and, therefore, it may be impossible to tell exactly what money
belongs to different creditors in a commingled account.' For example, by
referring again to Andrew's ledger, it is impossible to tell, with all the debits
and credits since the deposit of the proceeds, which of the funds may still be
considered "proceeds" of the car's sale:
Date Deposit Withdrawal Balance
March 15 None None $0.00
March 16 $400 (proceeds of car) $400
March 17 $300 (rent) $100
March 25 $500 (paycheck) $600
March 26 $500 (food/etc) $100
March 27 $500 (paycheck) $600
Consider that, once these proceeds were deposited, $300 was spent on
rent, and a new credit of $500 was added to the account. At this point, the
question is presented: did the new deposit of funds on March 25 replenish
Bob's collateral, or was at least part of that money irretrievably lost when
15 Id.
16 Id. at 414.
17 Id. at 411.
18 Id. (citations omitted).
19 Id.
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Andrew paid his rent? Since it is impossible to answer this question in the
"actual" sense of identifying exactly which dollars remain, equity substitutes a
fictional answer in these cases, such that courts are able to deal with these
complicated questions. As a result, the goal of "tracing" is not to trace any-
thing at all in many cases, but rather serves as an equitable substitute for the
impossibility of specific identification.
In some cases, courts employ fictional tracing principles for purposes
other than to resolve creditor disputes. For example, in Hanigan v. Trumble, a
fraudulent transfer case, money that was taken wrongfully was contributed to
the construction of a house.2° Citing to several state appellate decisions,21 the
Hanigan court stated that, when money is wrongfully taken and then "con-
verted into another type of asset" (here, it was converted to real property),
tracing is necessary to identify how much of the value is attributable to the
contribution of such money.22 As the state district court had awarded the inno-
cent party the entire house (obviously without employing tracing), the state
Supreme Court reversed and ordered that the victim was entitled to a construc-
tive trust23 on the property for the amount determined (via tracing) to have
been obtained through fraud.24 Here, the court did not apply any fictional trac-
ing principle, but actually required proof of the amount of property that had
been wrongfully taken be traced into the commingled mass. While the opinion
does not state exactly what method should be employed to trace the wrongfully
taken funds, it would appear that such a determination requires a 'battle of
experts.' In some cases, these battles are appropriate - as here, where it is
actually possible to show proof of a certain amount of funds entering an
account. But where that is simply not possible because of extensive commin-
gling - and where the courts have to pronounce some adjudication of the rights
of the parties - then courts must engage in fictional tracing.
To more fully understand when actual tracing (as opposed to fictional trac-
ing) is employed by the courts, compare Trumble with the following case. In
Farmers and Merchants National Bank v. Sooner Cooperative,25 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court explained the dual nature of tracing concepts. In that case, a
farmer whose crops were used as collateral for a loan participated in a federal
20 562 N.W.2d 526 (Neb. 1997).
21 The court cited cases from various jurisdictions, including: Arduin v. McGeorge, 595
So.2d 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Estate of Russell, 932 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. App. 1996);
Crestar Bank v. Williams, 462 S.E.2d 333 (Va. 1995); McFarland v. McFarland, 470
N.W.2d 849 (S.D. 1991); Cox v. Waudby, 433 N.W.2d 716 (Iowa 1988); Philadelphia v.
Mancini, 246 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1968).
22 Hanigan, 562 N.W.2d at 532.
23 This court explained the purpose of constructive trusts, stating "[a] constructive trust is
imposed when one has acquired legal title to property under such circumstances that he or
she may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest in the property." Id. at 531.
The court went on to explain that, while the legal title-holder is not deprived of title, the title-
holder is nevertheless treated as though it had because it becomes a trustee "holding title for
the benefit of those entitled to ownership thereof." Id. (citing Brtek v. Cihal, 515 N.W.2d
628 (Neb. 1994). By their very nature, then, cases where constructive trusts are imposed
require tracing in order to identify the property upon which the constructive trust is to be
imposed.
24 Hanigan, 562 N.W.2d at 532.
25 766 P.2d 325, 325-26 (Okla. 1988).
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payment-in-kind (PIK) program, wherein he received payment for crops that
were never harvested.2 6 When the farmer transferred the PIK payments to third
parties, the secured bank sued for recovery. Under these facts, the court had to
deal with the tracing issue the case presented once it determined that the PIK
payments were de facto proceeds of the crops (and, thus, collateral).27 In
explaining its approach, the court said:
The goal of "tracing" is to establish what portion of a commingled account consti-
tuted proceeds of the collateral. In factually traceable situations, where proceeds can
actually be traced into and out of an account, no resort to artificial tracing methods is
needed.28
The court then proceeded to explain that common artificial tracing meth-
ods include the lowest intermediate balance rule, as well as the "first in first
out" (which is explained in the next section of this note) method of tracing.2 9
However, as the court clarified, these methods should only be implemented
when "proceeds have completely lost their identity."3 Because the court
believed that the proceeds in the present case were actually traceable, it refused
to use an artificial tracing method.31 This court's holding illustrates that it is
critical to determine whether an artificial tracing method or "actual" tracing is
required in examining tracing principles from other areas of law.
2. How the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule Works
The second key pointed out by the Oriental Rug court is the manner in
which the lowest intermediate balance rule functions.3 2 Essentially, the rule
assumes that the debtor spends his own money from the commingled account
before he spends the creditor's proceeds.3 3 Thus, the creditor's proceeds only
remain in the account to the extent that the account balance remains at or above
the amount of the proceeds.34 As the debtor's balance drops below the total
amount of proceeds, the creditor's collateral drops accordingly. 35 As Professor
Palmer points out, even though the balance may later rise back up above the
amount of the proceeds, "courts do not treat the later deposits as a restitution of
26 The court described the Payment in Kind (PIK) program in the following manner:
The PIK program was instituted to alleviate the oversupply of grain which had accumulated on
the market. Operated by the Commodity Credit Corporation, a branch of the USDA, the pro-
gram gave participating farmers a quantity of grain in return for crops that otherwise would have
been produced .... Payment from the CCC was often in the form of grain stored on the farmer's
land from an earlier harvest. In a series of paper transactions designed to avoid actually moving
the grain, the CCC would purchase the farmer's stored grain and credit it as payment in kind for
the 1993 PIK program. The grain was then sold and the farmer received a check.
Id. at 326.
27 Id. at 328.
28 Id. at 329.
29 Id. n.19.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.R. 407, 411 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997),
cited in LYNN LoPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
(3d ed. 2000).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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the claimant's funds, and as a result, the claim against the account is limited to
the lowest intermediate balance between the time of the commingling and the
time when the rights of the claimant become fixed."36 Applying this principle
to Andrew's ledger (on pages 4 and 11) requires that Bob find the lowest bal-
ance in the account between the time the proceeds went in to the account, and
the time Bob makes his claim on the account (at Andrew's bankruptcy). In our
hypothetical, this tracing approach leaves Bob with only $100 of his security
intact.
In Oriental Rug, Yashar attempted to circumscribe this principle, arguing
in effect that he should be able to obtain a lien on inventory purchased with
Oriental's funds, without first establishing that the funds used to purchase such
inventory came from Yashar's inventory.37 Secured creditors like Yashar may
decry the idea that they have the burden to carefully monitor their debtor's
business practices to make sure they are not commingling their proceeds; How-
ever, as the Oriental Rug court illustrated, "both the case law and the leading
commentaries are clear in this regard."3 8
Since the lowest intermediate balance rule is so widely used (as the previ-
ous discussion demonstrates), and given that this rule is explicitly sanctioned in
Comment 3 to Section 9-315, it will presumably continue to play an important
role in Article 9 tracing.39 Creditors in cases like Oriental Rug, whose collat-
eral is misappropriated by unscrupulous debtors, can easily find fault with such
a rule. The new language of 9-315, Comment 3 gives creditors like Yashar the
ability to argue for a better alternative to the lowest intermediate balance rule.
B. The Hybrid: Lowest Intermediate Balance Combined with Pro Rata
Distribution
The lowest intermediate balance rule has also been adapted to fit other
similar, slightly more complicated cases as well. In Oriental Rug, for example,
Yashar was the only creditor who sought to trace Oriental's rug sale proceeds.
Indeed, cases of inventory financing clearly form the basis for some much more
interesting problems, especially in cases with multiple creditors. In one such
case, the Maine Supreme Court dealt with tracing issues by doing precisely
what revised 9-315(b)(2) recommends that courts do when it borrowed princi-
ples from other non-Uniform Commercial Code law (here, trust law). In Bom-
bardier Capital, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine,4 two creditors (both inventory
lenders) sought tracing of commingled collateral. At issue was a mobile home
dealer who had entered into separate floor plan financing agreements with both
Bombardier and Key Bank, each of which was aware of the other's agreement
36 GEORGE E. PALMER, 1 THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.16 at 200 (1978).
37 Oriental Rug, 205 B.R. at 413.
38 Id.
39 Another example of the popularity of the lowest intermediate balance rule, as pointed out
by Professor Markell, supra, note 1, is the fact that it has been codified in California as the
method to be used when tracing exempt funds. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 703.080(c)
(West 1987). Interestingly, the statute is similar to revised Article 9 in that it recommends
the lowest intermediate balance rule, unless "the exemption claimant or the judgment credi-
tor shows that some other method of tracing would better serve the interests of justice and
equity under the circumstances of the case." Id.
40 639 A.2d 1065 (Me. 1994).
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with the dealer.4 1 In October 1991, the dealer sold two of the mobile homes
financed by Bombardier and deposited the proceeds into its Key Bank
account.42 After depositing these funds, the dealer drafted checks totaling
$59,843.53, to pay Bombardier on its loan. 43  Before the checks were
presented, the account balance dropped to $21,793.84 (clearly, some of the col-
lateral had been spent).44 However, when the checks were delivered to
Bombadier a month later, there was plenty of money in the account to pay out
the checks.4 5 When Bombardier presented the checks for payment, they were
thus provisionally credited the $59,843.53.46 Unfortunately, while the
Bombadier checks were in the process of clearing, Key Bank noticed that some
of its units had been sold by the dealer out of trust and it demanded payment for
them immediately.47 When the bank did not receive payment by the demanded
deadline, it automatically debited the amount it was owed by the dealer, and
applied the entire account balance to its own debt.48
The court below awarded Bombardier $45,078.34, based on its calculation
of the lowest intermediate balance rule (which apparently consisted of the
$21,793.84 plus $23,280.00 from sales of later Bombardier inventory). 49 Key
Bank acknowledged that it had converted Bombardier's collateral, but argued
that Bombardier should not be entitled to the full lowest intermediate balance,
since Key Bank also held an interest in the proceeds deposited in the account,
where the dealer was out of trust on its inventory loan.50 Thus, the bank, bor-
rowing from trust law, argued that the court should apply the lowest intermedi-
ate balance pro rata, which would give a proportional distribution of the
proceeds in the account to each of the creditors.5" Under this argument, the
court would give each of the creditors a proration of the $45,073.84 remaining
in the account, since the dealer was out of trust in the amount of $88,906.17
and the dealer owed Bombardier $59,843.53.52 Faced with this argument under
the pre-revised Article 9, the Court noted that the code gave no specific gui-
dance as to how to trace commingled funds in an account, and complained that
"turning to the Code for guidance on this issue is like seeking the advice of the
Sphinx."53
41 Id. at 1065-66.
42 Id. at 1066.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Bombardier Capital, 639 A.2d at 1066.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1066-67. Although the code was of no help to the court, the pro rata distribution
method is a recognized tool courts have used to segregate commingled trust funds. See J.F.
Ghent, Annotation, Distribution of Funds Where Funds of More Than One Trust Have Been
Commingled By Trustee and Balance is Insufficient to Satisfy all Trust Claims, 17 A.L.R. 3d
937 (1968). Ghent classifies this method of commingled trust fund distribution as one of
three recognized by the courts (the other two are discussed in this note as well). Id. at 939.
The first method, he states, "is to relegate the trust beneficiaries to the status of general
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For its part, Bombardier noted the discrepancy with borrowing the pro rata
distribution method from trust law, arguing that such an approach assumes both
parties (Bombardier and the bank) are innocent; however, in light of Key
Bank's admitted conversion of its proceeds, Bombardier argued that such could
not be the case.54 The court agreed that a discrepancy does manifest itself
when law, designed for one purpose, is exported to another, stating, "Bombar-
dier's argument points up the difficulties involved in borrowing concepts from
trust law to solve legal conflicts between secured parties."" Considering this
difficulty, and considering the holdings of four other courts on similar issues,
the court concluded, "[w]e determine that the law borrows a concept from
equity without adopting the entire panoply of equitable principles."56 As a
result, the court found that had it applied the pro rata rule as it applies in trust
law, and therefore could not reach an equitable determination of the case:
"Conversion entitles a party to damages equaling the value of its property at the
time of the conversion"57 and the court believed that "to award Bombardier
anything more than its pro rata share would result in a windfall."58 In the end,
the court did import pro rata distribution from trust law, but was unable to fully
implement all of the equitable principles that would accompany that principle
in the secured transactions context.
This case highlights the difficulty in the application of revised 9-
315(b)(2). While the drafters clearly authorized courts to reach beyond the
lowest intermediate balance rule, as the court did in Bombardier Capital, the
drafters gave no real direction as to how this is to be done. Thus, while courts
have difficulty determining how to trace under current Article 9, this new lan-
guage may well add confusion to an already perplexing situation. At the very
least, the Bombardier Capital case illustrates exactly the kind of power that this
new 9-315 language gives to practitioners. While courts were previously tied
to whatever tracing equity is accepted in their jurisdiction, the new 9-315(b)(2)
language allows courts to follow the Maine Supreme Court's lead to creatively
expand their current notions of tracing principles to fit broader situations, and
to arguably achieve more just results. In other words, the revision may allow
for real innovation in bringing new ideas to bear in resolving these more com-
plicated cases.
C. Deposit Accounts as Collateral and Revised Section 9-104
Since the remainder of this note will be dedicated to describing other trac-
ing principles that are currently in use in other areas of law, it is important to
creditors." Id. The second method he identifies is use of FIFO. Id. Finally, he states, "[t]he
third method, recognized by most authorities as a just solution to the problem, is to distribute
the remaining balance among the trust beneficiaries according to their pro rata shares." Id.
" Bombardier Capital, 639 A.2d at 1068.
55 Id.
56 Id. The court additionally referred to Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Blue Island, 504 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Intermountain Porta Storage,
Inc., 74 B.R. 1011, 1016 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); Ex parte Alabama Mobile Homes, Inc.,
468 So.2d 156, 161 (Ala. 1985); and CO. Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 431
N.E.2d 370, 373 (I11. 982).
17 Bombardier Capital, 639 A.2d at 1068.
58 Id.
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note one of the other wrinkles that revised Article 9 adds to adopting these
"foreign" principles into secured transactions. Since Section 9-315 deals with
tracing funds in deposit accounts, 59 it should be noted as a preliminary matter
that the use of these very accounts as collateral for loans is now sanctioned by
revised Article 9, whereas it formerly was not. Section 9-104, also a new addi-
tion to Article 9, does more than allow deposit accounts to act as collateral: it
also simplifies the manner in which a bank may attach and perfect its interest in
deposit accounts.6 ° This section specifically permits "control" of deposit
accounts by creditors, and states that:
A secured party has control of a deposit account if: (1) the secured party is the bank
with which the deposit account is maintained; (2) the debtor, secured party, and bank
have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions
originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the deposit
account, without further consent by the debtor; or (3) the secured party becomes the
bank's customer with respect to the deposit account.
61
As Comment 2 to Section 9-104 explains, control "may substitute for an
authenticated security agreement as an element of attachment," and if the
"deposit account is taken as original collateral, the only method of perfection is
obtaining control under this section." If the Bombardier Capital case were
decided under revised Article 9, another wrinkle would have been added to the
problem of competing creditors with the addition of this new Section 9-104.
Because Key Bank was lending to the dealer under a floor plan arrangement,
there would have been a priority dispute that would be impossible to win at all
by Bombardier (since the fund was in the control of Key Bank as the "bank
with which the deposit account is maintained"6 ) when the proceeds from the
sale of the Bombardier-financed mobile homes were deposited into the account.
Under the new Section 9-104 scheme, Key Bank would get the benefit of "con-
trolling" the dealer's deposit account, even though it has no authenticated
security agreement with the dealer. As a result, this new control issue is an
additional concern for lawyers who seek to incorporate non-Article 9 tracing
principles into secured transactions.
D. FIFO and LIFO
Since the purpose of this inquiry is to look to other areas of law to deter-
mine whether their tracing principles work with secured transactions, the next
principles to be examined are those that courts have already accepted for use
with secured transactions. As mentioned above, the lowest intermediate bal-
ance rule is not really a tracing principle, but rather it is a convenient equitable
device for fictional tracing in situations where real tracing is impossible.63
Another such device is the "first in, first out" (FIFO) method of trust account-
59 "Deposit account" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-102(29) (2000) as "a demand, time, savings,
passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank. The term does not include investment
property or accounts evidenced by an instrument."
60 U.C.C. § 9-104 (2000).
61 Id.
62 U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(1) (2000).
63 See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
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ing. Professor Richard L. Barnes 64 describes the genesis of this principle in the
1809 English case, Devaynes v. Noble.65 There, a partner in a five-man bank-
ing firm died, leaving £1717 on deposit.6 6 The remaining partners continued to
use the account for deposits and withdrawals until they later declared insol-
vency.67 One of the bank's customers (Clayton) then sued the deceased part-
ner's estate, since it was not insolvent.6' As Professor Barnes explains:
The court announced the first in, first out presumption as the method for fixing the
deceased partner's liability. That is, the withdrawals made after the death were used
to first reduce the oldest deposits on hand. Since there had been £1717 in withdraw-
als since the death, the deposits on hand had been withdrawn and the deceased part-
ner's debt had been discharged.6 9
In a more modem decision regarding fraudulent transfer, Commonwealth
Land Title Insurance Co. v. John Doe,7 ° the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
describes this method in greater detail:
7 1
In attempting to trace funds, the Pennsylvania rule is "first in, first out." Pursuant to
this rule, "the legal presumption is that moneys were paid out in the order in which
they were paid in, and [the parties claiming ownership] are equitably entitled to any
allowable preference in the inverse order of the times of their respective payments
into the fund."7 2
In order to flush out this principle, consider again the hypothetical
Andrew's ledger:
Date Deposit Withdrawal Balance
March 15 None None $0.00
March 16 $400 (proceeds of car) $400
March 17 $300 (rent) $100
March 25 $500 (paycheck) $600
March 26 $500 (food/etc) $100
March 27 $500 (paycheck) $600
If Bob attempts to trace his $400 (proceeds of the car sale) into this com-
mingled account, the March 16 deposit of Bob's proceeds will be the starting
point of our analysis since, on March 15, there was no money on deposit.
When the $300 was paid out on March 17, Bob's proceeds were reduced
accordingly. Next, when the March 25 deposit of $500 is added, Bob's collat-
eral amount does not rise back up. Since only $100 of Bob's proceeds is still
on deposit, that $100 is used up entirely (as well as $400 from the March 25
"I Richard L. Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds: The Metamorphosis of Equity Princi-
ples Into U.C.C. Doctrine, 51 U. PITr. L. REv. 281 (1990).
65 35 Eng. Rep. 781 (1809).
66 Id. at 781-82.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Barnes, supra note 64, at 292.
70 577 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1990).
71 Both the Hanigan and Commonwealth Land Title cases are fraudulent transfers cases.
This is a perfect example of the fact that, while some courts deal with the need to assign
ownership to property in different ways, both use tracing techniques though doing so in a
different manner.
72 Commonwealth Land Title, 577 A.2d at 1360-61 (citation omitted).
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paycheck) when the $500 withdrawal occurs on March 26. The deposits are
simply removed in the order of their deposits. Professor Barnes criticizes the
logic behind this kind of principle as having "all the force of reason of a coin
flip, but it benefits from the appearance of being less arbitrary. The appearance
of evenhandedness is provided by the calendar of deposits and withdrawals.
7 3
Courts also use a very similar principle called "last in first out" (LIFO) in
tracing commingled funds.7" This concept may suffer from the same critique
as FIFO, but then so would the lowest intermediate balance rule. It applies the
same logic as FIFO to similar facts, but simply does so in the inverse order.75
In order to conceptualize this principle, consider a new balance sheet with a
starting balance of $500:
Date Deposit Withdrawal Balance
May 14 None None $500
May 15 $400 $100
May 16 $100 $0.00
May 17 $300 $300
May 25 $500 $800
May 26 $500 $300
May 27 $100 $200
In this case, the "last (money) in" is the $500 deposit made on May 25.
Applying LIFO then, that $500 will be the first money out when subsequent
withdrawals are made. Thus, when the $500 withdrawal is made on May 26,
the May 25 deposit has now been completely depleted under the LIFO fiction.
Next, when the subsequent withdrawal is made on May 27 ($100), that amount
is then debited from the $300 deposited on May 17, now that the May 25
deposit is gone. Thus, any subsequent withdrawals will be debited from this
$300, leaving only $200 of the May 17 deposit still in the account.
As is readily apparent in the basic outline of these principles, no one of
them has an inherent quality that makes it superior to any other in all circum-
stances. However, one may be far superior to the others, depending upon the
circumstances. Using this new balance sheet, for example, suppose that the
$300 deposit of May 17th is the proceeds of a client's collateral that was com-
mingled into this account. The attorney would not want to argue that FIFO
should be employed because his client's collateral would have all been spent on
13 See Barnes, supra note 64, at 294.
71 United States v. Intercontinental Indus., Inc., 635 F.2d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1980) ("INI
offers no reason why the district court should not have accepted the government's use of
LIFO in tracing the funds. LIFO is an accepted accounting method and its use was appropri-
ate here."). The court additionally notes that "[LIFO] is explained in great detail in the
district court's opinion." Id. (citing Taubman v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Mich
1978)). See also Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Traditional Investments Corp., 1995 WL
72410, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1995) (accepting that distributions had to be made "under
New York's Clayton Rule" and explaining that this concept is also known as "LIFO").
75 Chase Manhattan Bank, 1995 WL 72410, at *3. This case explains (in the context of a
commingled trust fund) that, under LIFO, "depositors receive their money 'in the inverse
order of the times of their respective payments into the fund."' Id. (citing In re A.
Bolognesi & Co., 254 F. 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1918)). As it continues, "... in other words,
under the Clayton Rule [LIFO] . . .trust monies [are] distributed before free or non-trust
monies." Id.
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May 26. Using LIFO, as just explained, would preserve some collateral ($200)
for the creditor. Likewise, using LIBR, $200 will be preserved for the creditor
as well. Under revised 9-315(b)(2) all three principles (and the others still to be
discussed) should be considered when a lawyer traces commingled collateral.
Depending upon the facts of any particular case, a completely different out-
come may result depending upon the fiction employed. Of course, this analysis
is only the beginning because of the multitude of different priority issues that
may be encountered in any one case. At the least, it appears that revised Arti-
cle 9 allows some room for lawyers in jurisdictions that have clung to any one
of these tracing fictions to bring in alternative arguments, as equity may
demand in each case.
III. SURVEY OF TRACING LAW
As mentioned previously, since the drafters deliberately chose this new
language for revised Article 9, there must be tracing principles (adopted in
other areas of law) that can be adopted into secured transactions law. This
section will proceed to review various areas of law and discuss if and how
tracing principles are employed therein. While this survey does not attempt to
recognize every potential situation where commingled funds might give rise to
a tracing issue, it does attempt to recognize many of the more common situa-
tions where these principles might present themselves. In addition, the section
attempts to explain some of the "typical" cases that illustrate these principles
and make them accessible to practitioners as a starting point for further
research, as well as serving to spark creativity in their application. As will be
seen, courts rarely adopt specific tracing principles in other areas of law.
Nonetheless, additional tracing principles do exist, as illustrated in the follow-
ing cases.
On a more superficial note, this section attempts to separate the various
cases herein presented into their distinct areas of law. This is the theoretic ideal
for organizational purposes, but is difficult in practice since, as the reader will
notice, there is substantial overlap between the situations presented. For exam-
ple, one of the cases described involves both tax and trust law, and addresses
both within the context of a bankruptcy. As a result, the cases are placed in the
sections that most closely correspond with the area of law out of which the
tracing principle arises.
A. Divorce Law and Community Property
A note on tracing must include a substantial overview of the various man-
ners in which courts determine divorce property disputes. In the course of the
author's research, it appeared clear that the two areas in which the most tracing
issues arise are divorce and bankruptcy. The reason that tracing issues so typi-
cally arise when dealing with divorce law is that, when the divorcees separate,
disputes over which of the property is separate and which is community can be
nearly impossible. This quandary arises because married couples often com-
mingle their funds during the marriage and seek to prove their "separate" share
only when the marriage falls apart. Due to the difficulty of tracing funds in
these cases, courts in community property jurisdictions begin the process with a
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presumption that such funds are community property.76 As the Texas Supreme
Court in McKinley v. McKinley described the process:7 7
It is the general rule that to discharge the burden imposed by the [community prop-
erty] statute a spouse.., must trace and clearly identify property claimed as separate
property. 78 It is further well settled that when the evidence shows that separate and
community property have been so commingled as to defy resegregation and identifi-
cation, the burden is not discharged and the statutory presumption prevails.
79
Clearly, then, the funds that cannot be divided are treated as community
property and will be split fifty-fifty in the divorce settlement in many cases.80
As the court in McKinley makes clear, the parties have a right to show some
proof that they can identify which of the funds are separate property.81 In some
situations, the only way to make such a showing is presumably through the use
of accounting records to show actual proof of deposits and withdrawals. For
example, when dealing with the assets of a sole proprietorship in the divorce,
one group of commentators explained that "[t]racing may be accomplished by
examining books kept during the marriage which identify and keep separate the
profits, (community) and the capital (separate). Careful record keeping which
reveals that no commingling of properties or funds occurred enables parties to
identify separate property."82 In these cases, the expectation is clearly not that
parties will engage in a fictional tracing exercise, but that they will bring in
accounting experts to prove actual credits and debits to the account in order to
carry the burden of proof as to the state of their property.
In McKinley, the parties sought to carry the tracing burden merely by
introducing an account sheet.83 However, the court found that this was not
enough to identify the nature of the debits and credits to the account and subse-
quently decided that the parties had not satisfied their burden of proof.84 It is
worth noting that such an approach is possible only insofar as the funds are not
commingled beyond recognition. In the event that the property's ownership is
beyond separation, a court following the McKinley rule should simply declare a
"tie" and send each party home with an equal share of the assets.
85
What the principle illustrated in McKinley effectively accomplishes is the
removal of a tracing burden altogether. This strict use of "actual" tracing
appears to be used only in cases where it is impossible to tell how much of the
contribution of separate property has been made into the commingled funds.
76 McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973).
17 See also Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), which cites McKinley
for this concept.
78 The court cites Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1965); Wilson v. Wilson, 201
S.W. 2d 226 (Tex. 1947); and Chapman v. Allen, 15 Tex. 278, 283 (Tex. 1885).
'9 McKinley, 496 S.W.2d at 543 (citations omitted).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Oliver S. Heard Jr. et al., Characterization of Marital Property, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 909,
926-27 (1987).
83 McKinley, 496 S.W.2d at 543-544, cited in Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 729.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 543
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Such a result makes sense in divorce law, where there is a statutory presump-
tion of equality with regard to the marital assets of the parties.
86
This is not to say that community property law is totally without fiction; in
fact, beyond trust law, the author's research indicates that it is probably the area
with the most creative methods for dividing commingled funds. California, for
example, has well-developed case law discussing the ability of spouses to trace
marital property throughout the marriage in order to determine whether it
should be characterized as separate or community property.87 Additionally,
Texas has adopted a principle for tracing "separate" funds that have been com-
mingled in deposit accounts and trust funds.
The Texas tracing principle (which cannot be used when the amount of the
separate funds is unknown) is the "community-out-first" rule. One such case,
Sibley v. Sibley, involved a scenario where different funds were mixed together
into a deposit account containing both community funds and some of the wife's
separate funds. 88 The amount of the wife's separate contribution was known to
be $3,566.38.89 As a result the court held:
Equity impresses a resulting trust on such funds in favor of the wife and
where the trustee draws checks on a fund in which the trust funds are mingled
with those of the trustee, the trustee is presumed to have checked out his own
money first, and is therefore an exception to the general rule.9 °
The court then explained that it recognized a presumption that community
funds were withdrawn from the account first, and so long as the account bal-
ance does not drop below the total amount of the separate property, then the
separate property retains its separate character. 9 1
Applying this principle to Andrew's ledger, so long as Bob knew the
amount of the car's proceeds ($400) that had gone into the account, and so long
as the account balance never dropped below that amount (which is not the case
here), then he could recover that amount. The rule is actually very simple, and
some have argued that the rule should be called the "trustee-out first rule,"92
since the presumption is that the beneficiary's funds are spent only after the
86 Id.
87 See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
88 286 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955). Sibley is cited to by Heard et al., supra note 82, as
the case in which this rule was first announced. Other Texas cases that have used this
community-out first presumption include Barrington v. Barrington, 290 S.W.2d 297, (Tex.
Ct. App. 1956) and Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
89 Sibley, 286 S.W.2d at 659.
90 Id. (citations omitted).
91 Id. For another article that reviews the Texas tracing cases in more depth, see Stewart W.
Gagnon & Christina H. Patierno, Reimbursement and Tracing: The Bread and Butter to a
Gourmet Family Law Tracing Case, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 323 (1997).
92 In Clark v. Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank, 9 F. Supp. 81, 89 (D. Mass. 1934) a Massa-
chusetts federal district court used this "trustee out first" rule in order to trace commingled
trust funds in the hands of a receiver. The court stated, "[w]here one who stands in the
position of a trustee mingles the trust res with his other funds, the law will presume that all
withdrawals from the mingled account were first withdrawals against his own money, rather
than against the trust fund." Id. As authority for this principle, the court cited to
Blumenfield v. Union Nat'l Bank of Beloit, 38 F.2d 455 (D. Kan. 1930), Dickson v. First
Nat'l Bank of Buffalo, 26 F.2d 411 (D. Okla. 1928), and Fiman v. South Dakota, 28 F.2d
776 (D. S.D. 1928).
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trustee's funds have been exhausted. Under either name, this rule is the func-
tional equivalent of the lowest intermediate balance rule, and is apparently
adapted for this context. In the community property context, this cousin to the
lowest intermediate balance rule seems well suited to recovering known sepa-
rate contributions to commingled accounts.
A curious aside on this point is the fact that the Louisiana courts use this
same principle in the reverse order. In Reinhardt v. Reinhardt,9 3 the court,
facing a segregation issue, explained that:
[W]hen separate funds are commingled are no longer capable of identification and it
is impossible to trace the origin of the funds, then all the funds are considered com-
munity. Further, there is a "presumption that withdrawals from an account in which
the community and separate funds are commingled are presumed to come first from
separate funds."
94
This simple assumption radically alters the manner of tracing community
property funds within commingled accounts in Louisiana. By simply shifting
this presumption, the claimant of the separate property gains an advantage,
given that the tracing fiction protects the separate funds as those remaining in
an account and the assumption is that the spent funds were exhausted first.
While these principles work adequately with ideal facts, once the facts
become complicated, they present more difficult issues. For example, imagine
that ten creditors have loaned money to a debtor who is now in bankruptcy, and
each creditor took separate collateral for its loan, such that each had first prior-
ity on his or her collateral. Next, suppose the debtor sold each creditor's collat-
eral for $1,000 and placed the proceeds (totaling $10,000) into an account at
various times; then, instead of paying the creditors, the debtor made withdraw-
als from the account for various purchases. While some of the purchases made
from the proceeds in the account may be traceable, suppose that only $1,000
remains in the account at the time of bankruptcy. Which of all these creditors
will be entitled to the funds in this account? One could argue that, when the
amounts of the funds are known, the pro rata hybrid of the lowest intermediate
balance rule could be employed to divide up the funds among the creditors (an
example of creative lawyering allowed by revised Article 9). But such argu-
ments cannot bridge all of the likely gaps to be encountered by importing such
cases into secured transactions. If the group of creditors includes the bank in
which the account is maintained, it will most likely take all the funds, as that
bank will have first priority in the deposit account under revised Section 9-104.
The key takeaway from this example is that a simple tracing fiction like com-
munity-out first can probably only be used in conjunction with secured transac-
tions when there are very few creditors and the priority issues do not present
the problems in the foregoing example. However, there may be very simple
cases where the community-out first principle - especially if used in tandem
with some other equitable trust principle - may lend aid in an Article 9 context.
Tracing seems to have had quite an extensive history in California.9 5 As
the following discussion highlights, courts in California have discussed at least
93 728 So.2d. 503 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
94 Id. at 507 (citation omitted). The court cited Cutting v. Cutting, 625 So.2d 1112 (La. Ct.
App. 1993), writ denied, 631 So.2d. 453 (1994), as authority for this proposition.
95 See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
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three different methods for tracing commingled funds from bank accounts, and
it seems from the case law that all may be available in any given case. Califor-
nia courts seem to be willing to fashion a remedy from these differing methods
in order to achieve justice among the parties, depending on the factual scena-
rios that present themselves in a particular case.
In an early case discussing the viability of tracing in California, See v.
See,9 6 divorcees of the See's Candies distinction faced the dilemma of segre-
gating their marital property. Each brought different theories to the table as to
how this should be accomplished.97 As the husband had kept two accounts,
one containing separate funds and one with community funds, he argued (over
his wife's objection) that, since he could prove that the amount of community
expenses exceeded the amount of community income during the marriage,
there could be no community property.9 8 In other words, he sought to recapit-
ulate9 9 the earnings of the entire marriage in order to show, in the end, that
there had been more community property expended than earned. Hence, the
community, as the argument goes, could not have acquired the disputed
assets.100 The faulty logic of this recapitulation method was rejected by the
California Supreme Court, which stated that one must prove the separate or
community nature of the property at the time it is acquired, not by later show-
ing that the community had a deficit in terms of overall earnings.1 0 ' Otherwise,
the court stated, a spouse's interest that is believed to be community could later
prove merely an "inchoate expectancy to be realized only if upon termination
of the marriage the community income fortuitously exceeded community
expenditures." 102
A later California decision, Marriage of Mix, faced a similar tracing issue;
however, it allowed a slightly different method of tracing than the "recapitula-
tion method," which had been rejected in See. 10 3 The Mix court cited See for
the proposition that, when dividing the marital assets, the presumption of com-
munity property will apply to a particular property if a spouse can prove that
the community property funds were not exhausted when that particular asset
was acquired." As a result, the court approved the exhaustion method, which
was a more logical extension of See.105 This method works on the presumption
that, when either party decides to commingle separate property with commu-
nity property in a community account without keeping records of their transac-
tions, the presumption of separate ownership is construed against that party in
favor of the community." ° Under this method, if a party can prove the exis-
96 415 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1966).
97 Id. at 782-83.
98 Id. at 779.
99 Id. at 783.
100 Id. at 782.
101 Id. at 783.
102 See v. See, 415 P.2d at 782-83. For an article discussing the interplay of these Califor-
nia cases, see Linda Gach, The Mix-Hicks Mix: Tracing Troubles under California's Com-
munity Property System, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1231 (1979).
103 536 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1975).
104 Id. at 483.
105 Id. at 483-84.
106 Id. at 483.
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tence of community funds at the time of acquiring any asset (in other words,
that the community funds had not been exhausted), then that asset will presum-
ably be owned by the community. 107
California courts have also discussed another tracing method, involving
less fiction than the exhaustion method, in Hicks v. Hicks.10 8 In Hicks, the
court allowed a husband to show evidence of the existence of separate funds in
a bank account consisting of dividends, proceeds from the sale of separate
property and loans secured with separate property collateral.109 He then
showed evidence of how these funds had been withdrawn in order to purchase
property which, he argued, was separate."o This "direct tracing" is fiction-less
because it involves no presumption of ownership as does the exhaustion
method; it apparently only requires good evidence and credibility as to the pur-
chaser's intent.
Since direct tracing is a method of tracing that exists in other areas of law
- and is perhaps the most logical way of tracing (if one is able to carry the
burden of proof with good records) - it brings little to the table in terms of new
tracing ideas for Article 9. However, since the exhaustion method is willing to
indulge in the presumption of a community property acquisition, perhaps it
presents an idea that can be imported into some secured transactions contexts.
B. Tracing in the Bankruptcy Context
As in the case of community property law, bankruptcy is an area of law
where tracing seems to be especially common. The reasons for the prevalence
of tracing in the context of bankruptcy is obvious; as in a divorce, bankruptcy is
a worst-case financial scenario for the entity that previously existed. Hence, it
often becomes necessary to sort out financial interests as various parties go
their separate ways in this context. In bankruptcy law, however, this "parting
of the ways" between debtors and creditors is more complicated, since there is
a trustee who also seeks to establish ownership to the property; as a result, the
ability to legally capture collateral in these contexts is of paramount impor-
tance. Many different areas of law can be implicated in the context of bank-
ruptcy tracings. Additionally, many of the tracing principles discussed
previously may become relevant in these proceedings.
1. Common Secured Transaction
By way of introduction, it is best to start with a more common tracing
situation in the bankruptcy context: a case where a secured creditor seeks to
prove his right to collateral. In Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New
England,"' Harley Davidson (together with ITT, a financial company) main-
tained a security interest in the entire motorcycle inventory of a motorcycle
dealer." 2 The bank (Old Colony) that financed the dealer's purchase of used
107 Id.
108 Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144 (1962).
109 Id. at 157.
110 Id. at 157-58.
112 897 F.2d 611 (st Cir. 1990).112 Id. at 613.
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motorcycles maintained a junior security interest in the dealer's inventory." 3
When the dealer declared bankruptcy, Harley (and ITT) alleged that Old Col-
ony had interfered with its collateral by holding the title certificates to some of
the motorcycles (which Old Colony had done in order to secure repayment of
its loan). 1 4 The plaintiffs argued that "the bank's practice caused the bank-
ruptcy of the dealer, thereby preventing them from collecting all the money the
dealer owed them and causing them to lose profits while they searched for a
replacement dealer."'" 5 Additionally, they alleged that the bank's practice of
holding the certificates constituted conversion of the certificates and the pro-
ceeds of the cycle sales.'
16
The tracing issue arose in this case when Old Colony defended by arguing
that the plaintiffs had no right to the proceeds from the sale of the cycle inven-
tory, citing to a comment by Professor Gilmore. "7 The comment indicated
that, if the dealer had commingled the proceeds of the inventory with other
funds of the dealer, they were no longer "identifiable," and the UCC did not
allow recovery by a secured creditor.' 18 The court rejected this argument by
pointing out that, while some early courts did follow Gilmore's view, it had
long since been rejected by the courts." 9 Additionally, the court pointed to the
many courts that have adopted tracing principles in order to identify commin-
gled proceeds. 12
0
2. Tax Trust Funds
A model case to demonstrate the prevalence of tracing principles in the
bankruptcy context is In re Megafoods Stores, Inc. 121 There, a bankrupt gro-
cery store did not turn collected local sales taxes over to the state before filing
for bankruptcy, but rather retained these funds in the store's general bank
accounts, commingling them with other funds.' 22 The state comptroller
asserted that a statutory trust should be imposed on these funds in an effort to
exempt them from the bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code §541.123 The
debtors disputed this assertion, arguing that, since the funds were commingled,
they could not be traced and, hence, no trust could be imposed upon them. 124
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Begier v. LR.S.,125 the court
explained that withheld tax funds may be placed in a tax trust. Further, such a
trust may be imposed at the "time the ... taxes are withheld."'126 As a result,
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Harley Davidson, cited to in GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY § 27.4 at 736 (1965).
"I Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 619 (1st Cir. 1990).
119 Id. at 619-20.
120 Id.
121 210 B.R. 351 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
122 Id. at 353.
123 Id. at 354.
124 Id.
125 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
126 Megafoods Stores, 210 B.R. at 355.
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segregation of the funds is not necessary for the imposition of such a trust. '
27
However, in determining which funds the trust applies to, the court stated that
"[t]he [Supreme] Court did not specifically address the issue of whether the
[lowest intermediate balance rule] is a viable method of tracing when a trust is
statutory in nature."' 12 8 Unable to find direction from the high court on the
issue, the court then considered post-Beiger case law in the Ninth Circuit to
determine that the lowest intermediate balance rule is "a viable method of trac-
ing statutory trust fund taxes which had been in the debtor's general accounts
along with non-trust funds ....
In re Megafoods is typical of bankruptcy disputes, since a trust device was
used to restore property to the party entitled to those funds. Additionally, it
demonstrates that other areas of law (i.e., tax law) are often implicated in these
proceedings. Hence, there are multiple opportunities for tracing issues to pre-
sent themselves in these cases, as indicated by Harley.
C. Trust Law, Property Law, and Bankruptcy
1. Constructive Trust
Another example of complex tracing issues in bankruptcy proceedings that
implicate other areas of the law is In re Handy & Harmon Refining Group. In
this case's rarified fact pattern, the creditor (the United States Mint) of a debtor
who filed for Chapter 11 protection sought to impose a constructive trust on the
proceeds of the sale of a "metal pool" maintained by the debtor.' 3 ° Specifi-
cally, the Mint had delivered to the debtor company a quantity of high-grade
silver bullion for refining.'a The debtor typically received quantities of metal
from customers and then either purchased the metal or simply returned the
same amount to a customer.132 The Mint argued that, since the debtor main-
tained a metal pool for which it kept records of deposits and withdrawals, the
situation was nearly analogous to a deposit account. 13 3 The Mint argued that,
under this analogy, it should be able to trace the amount of the proceeds of the
silver to which it was entitled through use of the lowest intermediate balance
rule.' 34 Since the amount of silver bullion 'on deposit' in the pool "never fell
below the amount of silver underlying the Mint's claim," it was entitled to trace
its ownership to the proceeds of the debtor's pool. 135
This argument is somewhat exemplary of the type of analysis that the
revised Section 9-315 has invited. It has borrowed a tracing principle from one
area of law (tracing of deposit accounts and trust funds) to another (tracing of
personal property in the form of a commingled mass), both of which have been
described previously. Unfortunately, Handy does not extend hope to those who
seek to emulate this type of reasoning-by-analogy, since the court rejected the
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 357.
13' 266 B.R. 24 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001).
31 Id. at 26.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 28.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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Mint's theory. The court reasoned that, if it were to impose a trust on the
silver-pool, it would have to do so for the benefit of all the consignors; none of
the proceeds of the silver would constitute non-trust funds. 1 3 6 The court then
explained that, since the lowest intermediate balance rule only applies when
"trust funds are commingled with non-trust funds," the tracing approach could
not apply in this situation to allow the Mint to trace its interest in the proceeds
of the pool.' 3 7 Again, this case demonstrates the difficulties that may arise
when one tries to apply tracing principles created for one purpose in a wholly
different context.
2. Trust Accounting Variation of the Lowest Intermediate Balance
Rule
One variation of the lowest intermediate balance rule was explained in the
context of a bankruptcy action in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Superior Court.'
38
In that case, a creditor (Chrysler) that held a security interest in the proceeds of
an insolvent dealership's car sales sought to recover funds from a cash collat-
eral account, where the funds had been transferred from the dealer's general
operating account.' 3 9 Since other creditors, also seeking the funds, proved that
the dealer had commingled the funds with non-proceeds, they argued that
Chrysler bore the burden of tracing the funds to show that they were identifi-
able.' These creditors argued that the lowest intermediate balance rule would
not help Chrysler, since the account at issue was maintained at a zero balance,
although collateral proceeds had once been deposited into the account.1
4
'
Therefore, argued the creditors, Chrysler had no claim to funds that were subse-
quently deposited but were not collateral proceeds.'1 4  In response, Chrysler
argued that an exception to the lowest intermediate balance rule should apply.
The court explained this exception as follows:
It has been held that where a trustee commingles personal funds with trust funds, and
dissipates the commingled funds such that the trust funds are affected, and then
deposits additional personal funds into the account, it may be presumed that the trus-
tee was intending to reimburse the trust funds. In such a situation, the trust funds will
be replenished.'
4 3
The principle Chrysler attempted to apply would have been a departure
indeed from the lowest intermediate balance rule that, as has been discussed, is
generally applied in a rigid manner.' 4 4 The court was unwilling to adopt this
exception to the general rule, reasoning that, "in our view this exception, if
136 In re Handy, 266 B.R. at 29.
137 Id.
138 17 Cal. App. 4th 1303 (1993).
139 Id. at 1308-10.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1316.
142 Id. at 1316-17.
143 Id. at 1317. The court cited the following cases as authority for this proposition: Mitch-
ell v. Dunn, 211 Cal. 126, 134 (1930); Church v. Bailey, 90 Cal. App. 2d 501, 504 (1949);
and In re California Trade Technical Schools, Inc., 923 F.2d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1991).
'" See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text discussing In re Oriental Rug Warehouse
Club, Inc., 205 B.R. 407 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997).
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broadly applied, would completely emasculate the rule."' 45 It continued that
the exception was "properly limited to contests between trustee and benefici-
ary, where the trustee essentially embezzles trust funds and subsequently
intends to, and does, replace them."
' 146
This "exception" to the lowest intermediate balance rule, which has been
used in both California and the Ninth Circuit, is indeed groundbreaking for this
inquiry. 147 It allows some of the rigidity of an important rule to flex in a situa-
tion where it would be equitable to do so, depending on the facts of a case. The
fact that this court rejected the invitation to extend such a rule in the pre-revi-
sion days is perhaps less consequential now that the Section 9-315 liberally
invites such arguments to be made.
3. Banking Law, Including Lending, Trust, and Investment Company
Law
A situation similar to the exemption of the tax trust fund described in
Chrysler Credit also arises in banking institution insolvency proceedings. The
broad rule in such scenarios is that:
[W]here a trust fund has been converted by the trustee company or commingled with
its other funds, the beneficiary is, where the beneficiary is able to trace it, under the
general rules applicable to trusts, to the general funds of the bank in the hands of the
receiver or liquidator, entitled to a priority or preference as to payment therefrom
148
This concept is discussed in various cases, such as In re Arcadia Trust
Co., wherein claimants were able to establish priority to trust funds upon the
trust company's insolvency, since the trust company had commingled the funds
with other of the company's funds. 149 A similar case arose in Glidden v.
Getalius, which also discussed the manner in which the invested funds may be
traced for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 50 The Glidden court stated that,
"where the trustee fails and has insufficient assets to meet fiduciary and general
obligations of such trustee, the preferences of the cestui que trustent are, as
occasion requires, confined to the lowest cash balance on hand at any time after
the trust funds were received. . . ."1 The court continued by explaining that
this method should be used unless the invested funds may be directly traced
into specific securities purchased and held by the trust company."' As a result,
it seems apparent that the lowest intermediate balance rule is required for the
cash invested in these trusts.
145 Chrysler Credit, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1317.
146 Id.
147 Mitchell, 211 Cal. at 134; Church, 90 Cal. App. 2d at 504; California Trade Technical
Sch., 923 F.2d at 646 (9th Cir. 1991).
148 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 645 (1996). The cited section cites to the cases discussed
in this section; additionally, it cites cases from the following jurisdictions as authority for
this rule: Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania.
149 268 N.Y.S. 759 (Sup. Ct., 4th App. Div. 1934).
1o 120 So. 1 (Fla. 1929).
151 Id. at 2.
152 Id.
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4. Client Trust Funds
A far less forgiving approach to trustee commingling is found in attorney
discipline proceedings. In one such case, Matter of Pomerantz, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld the disbarment of an attorney who commingled
various client funds with his own firm's funds, without keeping the records
required by the state rules of professional responsibility.15 3 As a result, the
state ethics board recommended the attorney's disbarment.' 5 4 While disbar-
ment may not be a universal remedy for this kind of violation,155 it is certainly
indicative of the fact that, with some trust funds, commingling is not tolerated
where very special fiduciary duties attach and, hence, the concept of tracing is
moot. 156
5. Association Trust Funds
Another related principle that has a certain visceral appeal - at least to
victims of clearly fraudulent commingling of funds - is the principle espoused
by the court in Smith v. Township of Au Gres.'57 In that case, a town treasurer
invested township funds into his own personal business, using these to purchase
goods in clear violation of his duty to keep such funds separate.1 58 Shortly
thereafter, his creditors filed a petition to force him into bankruptcy. 1 59 Had
there not been claims by other creditors, the court indicated that it would have
been inclined to grant the township a lien on the commingler's entire stock of
goods; 1 60 the court states that, "[w]here, as in this case, a wrongdoer knowingly
mingles the property of another with his own in such manner that it becomes
undistinguishable, the true owner may claim the whole mass ...(emphasis
added)."1 6 1 However, the court pointed out that, if the claim against the entire
fund were for more than what the township lost, it would work a hardship upon
the other creditors.' 62 As Professor Palmer points out, this view would most
likely not be applied by courts today, as it would likely cause undue hardship to
the guilty party. 1
6 3
153 714 A.2d 233 (N.J. 1998).
154 Id.
155 ROBERT H. ARONSON ET AL., PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 132 (2d ed. 1995). The authors indicate that, while most courts agree that
disbarment is the appropriate remedy for knowing misappropriation of client trust funds, it is
not necessarily the only remedy. Id. They cite to the fact that Section 4.1 of the ABA's
"Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions" does not take the "automatic disbarment"
approach. Id.
156 355 N.E.2d 3 (I11. 1976).
157 150 F. 257 (6th Cir. 1906), cited in PALMER, supra note 36, at § 2.13.
158 Id. at 259.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 260.
161 Id. at 260-61.
162 Id. at 261.
163 PALMER, supra note 36, at 169.
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6. Personal Property Law and Commingled Chattels: Approximate
Correctness
Personal property law dealing with commingled chattels would likewise
seek to avoid an unnecessary hardship on the commingler. In Somers v.
Kane, 1" the court stated that, although the defendant had wrongfully commin-
gled the logs at issue, "there should not be so drastic a result as the verdict
brings." '16 5 The logs of the plaintiff could not be identified "log for log" '166
after their mingling with those of the defendant's, but their relative amounts
and value could be found with "approximate correctness."' 67 Perhaps influen-
tial in this more lax approach to the personal property situation is the fact that,
under warehouseman law, it is generally understood that an owner's commod-
ity product, such as grains, will be mixed with grain of like kind when depos-
ited for storage.' 68 However, the Somers court also clarified that, in calculating
this approximate amount, "every reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of the
party wronged." '169 Professor Palmer agrees that this method of approximation
(borrowed from property law) reflects the changed attitude of the courts in
dealing with commingled trust funds. 7 '
These "compromise" principles, where courts allow identification of prop-
erty (through tracing) so that it can make a proportionate division, are capable
of use in many areas of law.' 7 ' Whatever their appeal, cases like Somers are
attractive to courts in part because they mitigate against the harsh effects of
allowing an innocent party to claim an entire fund, so long as there exists a way
to approximate or "trace" the innocent party's share. This principle holds
potential application in secured transactions, perhaps in some cases even as an
164 210 N.W. 287 (Minn. 1926), cited in CRIBBETT ET AL., PROPERTY, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 170 (7th ed. 1996).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Central States Corp. v. Luther, 215 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1954). See also 93
C.J.S. Warehousemen and Safe Depositories §14 (1996). An interesting aside addressing
this point is found in the California bankruptcy case In re California Pacific Rice Milling,
Ltd. 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 953 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 23, 2001). In this case, a rice farmer
claimed a producer's lien (under CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 55631 and 55634) against
the entirety of rice inventory in the possession of a grain processor (who stored the farmer's
rice), which had filed bankruptcy. Id. at 1-2. The court, however, noted that the farmer's
grain had only been commingled with rice of the same variety and crop year as his own. Id.
at 2. As such, the court refused to grant a producer's lien on the producer's entire inventory,
and held that such a lien could only extend to that rice with which the farmer's rice had been
commingled. Id. at 9-10. While this case does not discuss tracing principles, it is significant
in that it creates a limitation on the total amount of the "fund" - or, in this case, stored rice -
that can be traced in order to restore a creditor to its position prior to depositing its goods
with the debtor.
169 Somers, 210 N.W. at 288.
170 PALMER, supra note 36, at 169.
17' An example of the breadth of this principle, as described by Palmer, is its use in copy-
right law. Early courts refused to attempt apportionment of profits when copyrighted infor-
mation was incorporated into a work containing both original and copyrighted material. In
more modern times, however, the Supreme Court has required apportionment, (as in Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1939)) "despite the fact that anything like
an exact apportionment was impossible." PALMER, supra note 36, at 171-72.
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alternative to the lowest intermediate balance rule. Such potential is especially
poignant where the amount of money remaining in a commingled account is
higher than what the lowest intermediate balance would yield. As previously
mentioned, the lowest intermediate balance rule does not allow credit for
deposits made after the account balance has sunk to its lowest amount. Yet the
"approximate correctness" principle would essentially reject the fiction of iden-
tification through a rigid tracing principle in favor of a more equitable result, to
be determined by the court on a case-by-case basis. This kind of principle
could be implemented by a creditor like Bob, who would be able to estimate
the amount of the proceeds of the sale of his collateral (the car which was
wrongfully disposed of and whose proceeds were wrongfully commingled) that
went into Andrew's account. This way, he could claim more of the fund than
he would otherwise be able to claim through the lowest intermediate balance
rule. The obvious weakness of this principle is that it could only be applied in
very simple cases where few creditors could fight over the funds, and where the
bank account does not act as collateral for any loan to the debtor. This defi-
ciency results because, as the Au Gres case indicates, it would be inequitable to
estimate the contribution of one secured creditor, construing the doubts against
the commingler, if this allots money from the account to one creditor at the
expense of others who would have claims thereon.1 72 In the commercial con-
text, such cases are likely to be few and far between.
7. Estate Law: Wills and Will Substitutes
In reviewing cases involving estate instruments, courts typically have dis-
cussed the need for tracing in the context of ademption; in other words, a testa-
tor has bequeathed some specific property to an individual, who discovers after
the testator has died that the property bequeathed no longer exists. A typical
case is found in In re Estate of Warman.173 There, a testator had bequeathed
certain settlement proceeds to his wife; but, after making his will, the testator
evidently invested these funds into other assets. 174 The widow brought the
argument that she should be able to trace the settlement funds into the property
subsequently purchased. 175 In this particular case, the court did not permit this
kind of tracing, stating that "[t]o find otherwise would permit legatees of spe-
cific bequests of money to trace the money to any item purchased with the
money by arguing that the new asset was simply an investment of the for-
mer."' 176 While the results in such cases may diverge depending on the facts
and equities, it seems clear that the courts have not added any new tracing
principle in order to show whether or not ademption has occurred with respect
to certain property.177
A related case that involved a will-substitute, however, was decided in a
manner similar to another type of case that this note has reviewed previously,
172 Smith v. Township of Au Gres, 150 F. 257, 261 (6th Cir. 1906).
173 682 N.E.2d 557 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
174 Id. at 559-60.
175 Id. at 560.
176 Id. at 563.
177 See, e.g., In re Potter's Will, 251 A.D. 679 (N.Y. 1937); Estate of Mayberry v. May-
berry, 886 S.W.2d 627 (Ark. 1994).
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and indicates that estate law is capable of using tracing principles from other
areas of law. In Peterson v. Swan, 178 a replevin action was brought by the
mother of a deceased daughter against her son-in-law to recover certain bonds
in which the mother was named as beneficiary.' 79 The husband contended that
the bonds were wrongfully purchased with joint funds, since the couple had
voluntarily commingled their funds. 8 ° The court, accepting the husband's
proof that the bonds were purchased with joint funds, held that "[t]he rule in
this state is well-established that, where a wrongdoer uses money of another in
the purchase of property in the name of a third-person, the owner of the money
is entitled to enforce a constructive trust or equitable lien upon the property
purchased."'' The court then stated a broad rule, similar to that in Township
of Au Gres, supra, that even where the commingling is voluntary (not wrongful
as in Au Gres), where one takes such joint funds and purchases property
wrongfully, "if it is impossible to make an equitable division, the whole of the
converted property should be held to be that of the party who has done no
wrong." ' 82 As a result, a tracing principle was applied in this case, where a
will substitute was used to bequeath property. However, even though this case
involved a will substitute, it appears that the court applied this rule, since it
allowed the husband to impose a constructive trust on the property. 18 3 As a
result, estate law really adds little to any discussion of which tracing principles
may be borrowed into secured transactions law.
D. Criminal Law
1. Money Laundering and RICO Violations
Professors Kirk McCormick and Brian Steckloff discuss tracing in the
context of money laundering prosecutions in their article on the subject. 184
Importantly, they note that 18 U.S.C. § 1956 provides that the government does
not have to trace the source of laundered funds in order to charge a defen-
dant. 185 Instead, they declare, the government need only "present evidence
demonstrating that the defendant engaged in conduct typical of that type of
criminal activity and had no other legitimate source of funds."' 18 6 A similar
result obtains in the case of RICO violations, where the government seeks to
force the forfeit of proceeds of racketeering activity.' 87
178 57 N.W.2d 842 (Minn. 1953).
179 Id. at 845.
180 Id. at 844-45.
181 Id. at 845.
182 Id. at 847.
183 Id. at 845.
1'1 Kirk McCormick & Brian Stekloff, Money Laundering, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 729
(Spring 2000).
185 See also United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 1999).
186 See McCormick et al., supra note 184, at 740-41.
187 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1985). In this case,
the court upheld a forfeiture order against a defendant. Essentially, the court rejected an
argument that, since the proceeds of the racketeering activity are not identifiable through
direct tracing to specific assets, the government should not be able to forfeit the assets. Id. at
969. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court's precedent in Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983), which it claimed "controls this situation by analogy." The court
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On the other hand, tracing does come into play if the government wants
the defendant to forfeit the funds allegedly laundered or property allegedly pur-
chased with laundered funds. As the professors summarize, "The government
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property it seeks has
'some nexus to the property 'involved in' the money laundering offense."" 88
If a defendant has commingled legitimate and tainted funds, courts may still
conclude that all funds in the account are subject to forfeiture. For example, in
United States v. All Funds Distributed to Edward Weiss, the defendants ran a
business (B.R. Ambulance Service, Inc.) that provided transportation to Medi-
care beneficiaries. 189 The government discovered that the owners of the busi-
ness (Edward and Rosemary Weiss) had submitted both legitimate and
fraudulent claims to Medicare for reimbursement over a four-year period.' 90
BR had commingled the funds it received from these fraudulent claims with
funds from legitimate claims. These funds were then used to run the business,
as well as to fund a pension fund, of which the unscrupulous Weiss couple
owned an eighty percent interest.' 9 ' When BR filed for bankruptcy, the pen-
sion fund was converted into a substantial amount of cash, which the Weisses
invested in IRA accounts at a bank. 192 The key issue in this case became
whether the proceeds were "specific" and "identifiable," or whether they were
"fungible" (as this determined the relevant statute of limitations).' 93 The
seizure of these accounts was ultimately denied by the courts because the
seizure of the funds was time barred under 18 U.S.C. § 984(c). 1 94
2. Embezzled Funds and Narcotics Proceeds
United States v. 170 Westfield Drive195 discusses a method of tracing
laundered funds. In that case, the claimant's ex-husband, Robert Catallozi,
embezzled over a million dollars from the US Postal Service. 19 6 The money
was then placed into Catalozzi's wife's company's checking account, which
funds were then used by Catalozzi to buy certain parcels of real estate, includ-
ing that utilized in the construction of a home.' 97 Upon discovery of the crime,
the federal government sought forfeiture of both the property and deposit
explained that the relevant forfeiture provisions of the United States Code did apply to forfeit
profits of the illegal enterprise, as well as any interest therein. Id. at 970. As the Seventh
Circuit explained in United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 801, (7th Cir 1985), "RICO
forfeiture [under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (year)] is a punishment imposed on a guilty defen-
dant. It deprives that defendant of all of the profits or proceeds that he has acquired through
racketeering activity, regardless of whether those assets are themselves "tainted" by use in
connection with the illegal activity." Hence, it is clear that the government's tracing duty
under the RICO forfeiture provision is very limited; it need only establish some limited tie of
the funds or assets to the racketeering activity in order to forfeit these.
188 See McCormick et al., supra note 184, at 742 (citation omitted).
189 2001 WL 1150217 at *1 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 21, 2001).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 id.
193 Id. at 2.
194 Id.
195 34 F. Supp.2d. 107 (D.R.I. 1999).
196 Id. at 110.
197 Id. at 110-111.
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accounts into which these funds had been placed.98. Since the court considered
this money to be "mixed and moved" (in other words, commingled with the
wife's legitimate funds and then moved out of the account, as opposed to
merely "mixed," as is the case with simple commingling of legitimate and
tainted funds where the funds remain in the same account), the court faced the
dilemma of deciding whether it could forfeit the wife's interest in the house and
deposit accounts.' 99
The court noted that there is a split in the federal circuits as to whether the
government can trace the funds in an account in order to impose forfeiture in a
case with "mixed and moved" money. 2' The court explained that "the Third
Circuit gives criminals the benefit of the doubt. It holds that the government
must actually trace the untraceable. Because the government cannot prove that
withdrawn money is actually illicit money, it cannot forfeit "mixed and moved"
money as traceable."' 2 ' Choosing to side with those courts that allow tracing
of such funds, that court noted that, in the Second Circuit, tracing of such funds
is performed by use of a tool equivalent to the lowest intermediate balance
rule.2 °2 It explained:
To trace the illicit money, the Second Circuit tapped a trusts doctrine known as the
"lowest intermediate balance" analysis exemplified by this illustration: if $100 from
a drug sale is deposited into an active account, the proceeds in the account are "trace-
able" to the extent of $100 as long as the balance never falls below that amount; the
untainted money added to the account after the balance falls below $100 is immune
from seizure. The Second Circuit referred to this analysis as the "drugs-in - last out
rule." As to mixed money in a bank account, this Court broadens the "drugs-in - last
out" into an "illicit-in - last out" rule. The government may forfeit the lesser of the
illicit money or the lowest balance since the illicit money was deposited.20 3
Broadening this principle, as recognized by this court, becomes more diffi-
cult when the funds are "mixed and moved. 20 4 It is interesting to note how
this court applied these trust principles - not only in this laundering context,
but in illegal-drug sales proceeds forfeitures as well. Such application demon-
strates how widely these "trust" principles may be applied throughout various
areas of law. Again following the Second Circuit, the court explained that,
when money is moved, courts have adopted the "drugs-in - first out" theory,
which allows the government to "trace the illicit money into any withdrawal or
purchase to the extent of the illicit deposits. 20 5 The rationale for this different
method is an assumption that "the criminal left the legitimate money in the
account.
206
It is interesting to see courts within these areas of law taking such diver-
gent views of tracing in this context. Unfortunately for this inquiry, the princi-
ples that they have adopted for use in this context are the same generic trust law
198 Id.
199 Id. at 116-18.
200 Id. at 116-17.
201 Id. at 117 (citing United States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996)).
202 Id. at 116.
203 Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
204 Id. at 116-117.
205 Id. at 117.
206 Id.
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principles that have been explained in this paper, albeit with more descriptive
titles for the genre of cases. Hence, these cases really appear to add little to our
bank of "tracing principles" that can be adopted into secured transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen how courts will interpret the revised Section 9-
315(b)(2) and whether they will do so in such a manner as to invite and/or
allow for some of the creative lawyering that has been discussed in this note.
As has been discussed, it may be that, with the multitude of cases to be heard,
courts will have difficulty breaking with the lowest intermediate balance rule
with which they seem so comfortable at present. While the extent of change is
open to speculation, it is likely that the language in revised Article 9 will begin
to have some effect on tracing in Article 9, whether that be in a subtle or sub-
stantial fashion, once practitioners realize the power that has been given to
them under the revised law.
Clearly, the opportunity to use tools other than the lowest intermediate
balance rule should be of sincere interest to any lawyer whose client stands to
benefit from a good-faith argument for the application of one of the equitable
tracing principles that have been described above. By far, the biggest challenge
to those making these arguments will be working through the priority issues
that will most certainly face the courts whenever the application of new princi-
ples is argued. As each case brings a new set of facts to the table, only time
will tell whether courts will be able to square a particular set of facts with the
various combinations of equitable principles enumerated in this note, and
broaden the instances of tracing within the law of secured transactions.
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